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Once a patient consults 
a general practitioner, or 
is admitted to hospital, 
and is given instructions 
for treatment or referred 
to a specialist, what duty 
does the medical professional 
have to ensure compliance with 
the agreed treatments? Should 
a doctor promptly disclose to a 
patient the occurrence of an 
adverse event related to his 
or her care? This article 
evaluates the expansion 
of the fiduciary aspects 
of the doctor:patient 
relationship to 
incorporate such 
duties.
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D
efining the beginning and end of the doctor:
patient relationship has traditionally been a 
means of circumscribing the responsibilities 
of medical professionals. At common law, 
a doctor:patient relationship begins with 
the proven acceptance of clinical responsibility by a duly 
registered doctor. The basic legal responsibility of a doctor 
is to exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of 
advice and treatment to a patient who has requested or been 
allocated his or her professional services.1
The doctor:patient relationship is generally deemed to have 
commenced at common law even if it came about as a result 
of clinical research, or the demands of a third party (such as 
an insurer, the police, an employer, or public health official).2 
Once the doctor:patient relationship has begun, a myriad 
of ethical, common law, legislative and international human 
rights obligations apply.
Irrespective of which party wants to terminate the doctor:
patient relationship, reasonable notice must be given in 
order for a doctor to ensure continuity of care.3 Recent 
Australian decisions, however, appear to be redefining legal 
responsibilities at what used to be considered the ‘tail end’ of 
the doctor:patient relationship.4 One of the most important 
changes involves the expansion of the doctor’s duty of care in 
relation to follow-up.5 It has also been argued that doctors’ 
fiduciary obligations should be expanded to include a related 
duty to promptly (at least before hospital discharge) disclose 
to patients adverse medical events related to their own 
treatment.6
Some commentators contend that such redefinitions 
may have a significant impact on the practice of medicine 
in Australia, creating increased costs from over-servicing, 
or ‘defensive medicine’.7  Others believe that such duties 
represent a return to paternalism in medical decision-making, 
which is unwanted and unwarranted at a time when patients 
are increasingly seen as ‘consumers’ who are allegedly willing 
to trade universal access to basic care for freedom of choice 
and responsibility to pay.8  A ‘consumerist’ right of self-
determination, according to this view, opposes the duty to 
follow up, because it accords the doctor the power to give 
commands, rather than being an entrepreneurial provider of 
discretionary advice.9
FOLLOW-UP: A FIDUCIARY DUTY?
In Breen v Williams, the High Court did not consider the 
doctor:patient relationship to be comprehensively covered 
by legal rules of fiduciary responsibility.10  The Court 
emphasised that the primary legal duty of the doctor was to 
exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of advice 
and treatment. It was not to act ‘on behalf of’ a patient, or 
with ‘undivided’11 or ‘uncompromising’12 loyalty, so as to 
avoid any conflict of interest whatsoever, or to warrant that 
treatment would be successful.13 
The justices found only fiduciary ‘elements’ in the 
relationship.  These fidicuary elements evolved from the 
sensitive and intimate nature of patient reliance, the patient’s 
need for bodily exposure and to divulge confidential 
information, and his or her presumed inability to fully 
protect personal economic interests.14  Such restricted 
‘fiduciary elements’ were expressed as legal rules requiring 
that doctors keep patient information confidential, receive 
no more than proper remuneration and not procure gifts, 
nor sexually intimidate or abuse the patient.15 The Court was 
careful to leave open the capacity of the fiduciary concept 
to ‘monitor the abuse of loyalty reposed in the medical 
practitioner by a patient’, particularly where the doctor 
has obtained commercial benefit or financial gain from the 
patient beyond the agreed fee.16
In a privatised healthcare system, however, contractual 
obligations may become the starting point for a discussion 
of any medical duty to follow up. Another option would be 
to extend the tortious duty of care in medical negligence, as 
occurred in Rogers v Whitaker17 and Lowns v Woods.18 The High 
Court, however, has been exceedingly reluctant to pursue 
justice by finding new tortious duties of care given the raft 
of state and federal legislation19 that followed the medical 
indemnity ‘crisis’ and consequent Ipp Committee Report.20
In Harriton v Stephens,21 for example, a majority of the High 
Court refused to find an actionable duty of care to a child 
born with catastrophic disabilities as a result of her mother’s 
doctor failing to correctly order, interpret and communicate 
routinely ordered diagnostic tests for rubella, in order to give 
the parents the choice of termination. Kirby J, in dissent, 
agreed with the dissent of Mason P in the Supreme Court, 
and held that the tortious claim in this instance involved 
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physical damage (the disability), which was reasonably 
foreseeable and preventable and caused by the doctor’s failure 
to diagnose and give advice. Both judges disagreed with the 
concern of their respective majority brethren about the ‘keep 
out’ signs erected by numerous state parliaments in recent 
legislation restricting tortious liability. As Mason P held: ‘I 
know of no principle that directs the common law to pause 
or go into reverse simply because of the accumulation of 
miscellaneous statutory overrides.’22
Other Australian courts, however, have held that – at very 
least, in the case of patients with serious conditions – doctors 
have a responsibility, which may be based either in fiduciary 
duty or negligence, to send reminders in the event of missed 
appointments.23 These standards have to some extent been 
incorporated in guidelines prepared by the Australian 
Medical Association and the Royal Australian College of 
General Practitioners.24 These guidelines are carefully worded 
to place only an ethical rather than a legal obligation on 
medical practitioners.
The question considered here is whether an expansion 
of fiduciary duty is more likely to be accepted as the 
common ground for claims related to issues of obtaining or 
communicating follow up, or of promptly disclosing adverse 
events.25
Burnett v Kalokerinos 26
Ms Burnett (the plaintiff) complained of nausea, fainting 
spells, a lack of energy, and vaginal bleeding to the defendant 
GP, Dr Kalokerinos.  He made an appointment for her with a 
specialist gynaecologist in Tamworth.
It was accepted by the court that Ms Burnett returned (in 
an unrecorded visit) to the defendant’s practice later in the 
day.  She then allegedly informed him that, due to family, 
financial and transportation problems, she could not keep the 
specialist appointment. She requested a referral to the nearby 
town of Inverell.  The defendant allegedly replied that he did 
not ‘deal with anyone in Inverell’ and that it was her choice 
whether she kept the Tamworth appointment.  Ms Burnett 
emphasized that she could not make it to the specialist, to 
which Dr Kalokerinos allegedly responded (under oath he 
denied any recollection of the event): ‘just see how it goes 
and it might settle down’.  Given this reassurance, Ms Burnett 
sought no further treatment for the next 12 months.
She was later diagnosed with cervical cancer and 
underwent radical surgery (including hysterectomy) and 
radiation treatment.  Ultimately, this was a case in which an 
earlier diagnosis would have avoided, or at the very least 
reduced, the adverse consequences of treating Ms Burnett’s 
metastasising cervical cancer.  She was awarded the full 
amount of her loss, which was later reduced on appeal.
While discussing contributory negligence, Spender 
AJ referred to the fiduciary nature of the doctor:patient 
relationship, with its inherent imbalance of power and 
knowledge.27  On appeal, however, the plaintiff was found 
to have been liable for contributory negligence (her damages 
were reduced by 20%), as she should have acted in response 
to the worsening of her condition.28  This case raises a 
relevant broader issue.  Liability for failure to follow up is 
a serious fiduciary concern for doctors in regional areas, 
where patients often need to travel great distances to obtain 
specialist treatments.
Wang v Central Sydney Area Health Service
In this case,29 Justice Hidden held that a duty to follow up 
extended to the care of a patient with head injuries in a 
hospital emergency department who sought release against 
medical advice.  Hidden J indicated that the Central Sydney 
Area Health Service, as the statutory authority, was under a 
duty to provide reasonable care for the plaintiff’s well-being 
to the reasonable limit of its resources.30
Kite v Malycha
In Kite v Malycha,31 Dr Malycha biopsied a lump in Mrs 
Kite’s breast and sent the specimen away for testing.  This 
procedure was not recorded in Dr Malycha’s notes.  Mrs Kite 
was told that she needed to call to obtain the results, and a 
follow-up appointment was made and recorded on a card 
given to Mrs Kite.32 The specimen was analysed, found to be 
‘highly suspicious of carcinoma’ and the results were faxed 
back to Dr Malycha’s office.  He denied that he had received 
the results, but the Court found that his office had received a 
fax, although it accepted that Dr Malycha had never seen it.33 
Mrs Kite assumed that, as she had not heard anything 
further from Dr Malycha, there was no cause for concern.  
Nine months later, she consulted Dr Malycha and was 
diagnosed with metastatic breast carcinoma. Dr Malycha was 
found liable for not following up on the test results, and in 
failing to have a reminder system to check whether such 
reports had been returned.34 An important issue in this case 
was whether the patient has a duty to take reasonable care for 
his or her own safety and wellbeing.35  Such a finding would 
have mitigated the claim in damages against the doctor.  On 
this point, Perry J highlighted the vulnerability of the patient:
‘I do not think that the courts should be quick to find 
contributory negligence on the part of patients who 
have put themselves in the hands of competent medical 
practitioners for advice and treatment.’36
The then South Australian AMA President, Dr Rodney Pearce, 
asserted that ‘until [Kite v Malycha] we believed the patient-
doctor relationship involved joint obligations’.37
Tai v Hatzistavrou
In this case,38 the plaintiff (Mrs Hatzistavrou) consulted the 
defendant (Dr Tai), a specialist gynaecologist, complaining of 
post-menopausal bleeding.  A physical examination did not 
reveal anything abnormal, so Dr Tai decided that a dilation 
and curette (D&C) procedure was necessary to rule out 
the possibility of cancer.  It was normal procedure for Dr 
Tai to fill out an admission form for surgery and allow the 
patient to submit it directly to the hospital.  Mrs Hatzistavrou 
submitted the form on the same day.  She then waited for 
the hospital to contact her and Dr Tai with the date for the 
procedure.
The form was lost in hospital administration and the 
date for the procedure was never set.  Dr Tai did not 
follow up.  Ten months later, the plaintiff returned for a 
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consultation with Dr Tai, complaining of further bleeding.  
He immediately booked her in for a D&C procedure, which 
led to the discovery of ovarian cancer that had spread to the 
uterus.
It was held by the NSW Court of Appeal that Dr Tai was 
negligent in not better monitoring the plaintiff’s progress.  
Preistley JA stated:
‘[if] the doctor thinks it necessary, even for only prudential 
reasons, that the patient should submit to a particular 
surgical procedure, then the doctor has a continuing duty 
to advise the patient to submit to the surgical procedure, so 
long as the doctor/patient relationship is on foot.’39
Powell JA saw no need to extend the duty, as articulated in 
Rogers v Whitaker,40 to cover the facts of the present case.  He 
cited with approval Perry J’s decision in Kite v Malycha, and 
held that Dr Tai was negligent through:
‘what appears to have been inadequacies in his own 
system, [he] failed to ensure that the procedure which 
he considered necessary in the respondent’s interest was 
carried out, the results obtained and the respondent 
advised accordingly’.41
Together, the cases of Burnett v Kalokerinos, Kite v Malycha, 
Tai v Hatzistavrou and Wang v Central Sydney Area Health 
Service suggest that courts (particularly in NSW) are placing 
a higher onus on healthcare practitioners and hospitals not 
only to provide treatment but also to take responsibility for 
those patients who fail to return for treatment or results.42  
The basis of liability involved elements of tortious negligence, 
fiduciary duty and statutory liability.
In a recent study, an overwhelming majority of patients 
surveyed (94.1%) expected doctors to follow up even on 
their missed appointments.43  It is likely, then, that most 
patients still view the doctor:patient relationship as one in 
which they can safely rely on their doctor to give appropriate 
medical instructions (rather than ‘consumer advice’).
A FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION TO PROMPTLY 
DISCLOSE ADVERSE EVENTS
In Australia, there is no legal obligation on medical 
practitioners to disclose to a patient any adverse event 
that they know or suspect they have caused. In some 
jurisdictions, professional obligations require reporting 
incompetent conduct by a colleague to the Medical Boards.44 
Yet, giving information to a patient about core aspects of 
their treatment and any consequences, adverse or not, is 
recognised as a core component of fundamental professional 
virtues, ethical principles and norms of health law and 
international human rights.45 It is also recognised as central 
to medical fiduciary obligations.46
Where patients have suffered an adverse event, surely this 
heightens their vulnerability? The equitable case for attaching 
a fiduciary duty to relevant aspects of the doctor:patient  
relationship is undoubtedly persuasive in such circumstances. 
Increasingly, hospital guidelines are requiring hospital staff 
to report as many adverse events as possible, including 
‘near-miss’ events. The reporting, however, is usually done 
to regulatory authorities as part of anonymous sentinel 
event incident monitoring studies.  Often hospital guidelines 
mention an ethical obligation to inform the patient of 
the event. Occasionally, they mention that this is actually 
important in heading off the possibility of subsequent 
litigation. 
Tort law reform legislation has permitted doctors to make 
an apology without this being construed as an admission 
of liability.47 The legislative definition may, in the ACT and 
NSW, facilitate early disclosure of an adverse event (as the 
background circumstances rationally contextualising the 
apology). It may also incorporate an acknowledgement of 
fault without liability, although it does not require it.48  Thus, 
legislation that was designed to ease patient complaints may, 
in fact, be an effective means of expanding patient rights and 
access to information.
Allowing doctors to disclose adverse events in an apology, 
without risk of liability, may increase the likelihood of a 
patient being informed promptly when such events have 
occurred, perhaps before a statutory limitation period has 
expired. But from a patient’s perspective, this may seem like 
an unsatisfactory result, as s/he is unable to take legal action 
over the adverse events revealed in an apology. Yet, without 
the benefit of protection from liability, medical practitioners 
may have little incentive to act in the public interest and 
promptly inform a patient of any adverse events that may 
have occurred, particularly in the private healthcare system 
where an employer or administrator may advocate non-
disclosure on cost/benefit grounds.49
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Allowing the right to prompt disclosure of adverse events 
to be relinquished – by a consent form, for example – seems 
to be rarely, if ever, justifiable. One exception might be 
where disclosure of the information could reasonably be 
judged by a health professional to lead to an imminent 
risk of substantial harm to the patient (equivalent to 
therapeutic privilege under the disclosure of material risk 
doctrine). Another could be necessity (the need to protect 
a patient from some external immediate and substantial 
harm), though the relevant risk of harm would have to be 
substantial, imminent and well-documented. Consideration 
could be given to statutory protections from subpoena and 
discovery, as are enjoyed by both hospital morbidity and 
mortality, and research and clinical ethics committees.
Should there be legal repercussions for failing to provide 
open disclosure of medical mistakes, particularly if a 
limitation period has passed? A cause of action for negligent 
medical treatment generally arises when the negligent act 
occurs and results in loss, damage or injury. However, this 
can be a complex issue, especially where non-disclosure 
has delayed the action. Avoiding prompt disclosure may 
mean that a limitation period passes, denying a patient the 
right to compensation.50  An extension may be granted at a 
court’s discretion where it finds deliberate non-disclosure, 
strategically late disclosure or fraudulent concealment of an 
adverse event.51  In Australia, changes made after the Ipp 
Report recommendations in NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and 
the Northern Territory have rendered such extensions less 
likely.52 In these jurisdictions, the limitation clock runs from 
the date when the cause of action is discoverable.53
Finding that prompt disclosure of adverse events is  
one of the fiduciary elements in the doctor:patient 
relationship might have further benefits, creating an 
important spur for quality and safety improvements  
in Australian healthcare. 
CONCLUSION
In Australia, injured patients must initially sue individual 
doctors and nurses in negligence in order to receive 
compensation. For health professionals, the risk of 
personal liability creates a conflict between their duty to 
relieve patient suffering and their obligation (encouraged 
by medical indemnity insurers and hospital contracts) to 
comply with health law and risk limitation guidelines.
Hospitals are no longer regarded legally as charitable, 
custodial institutions where staff create their own standards 
and regime of care, and the institution is liable only for 
the adequacy of their selection.54 Vicarious liability now 
imposes strict liability on the hospital for the negligence of 
salaried staff acting within the usual course and contractual 
scope of their employment.55 The non-delegable duty of 
care56 (based, like fiduciary duty, on the general principle of 
special vulnerability and dependence of patients)57 embraces 
hospital responsibility for the negligence of independent 
contractors, such as visiting medical officers, under a general 
obligation to use reasonable care in treatment. Conceptual 
confusion persists, however, between this non-delegable 
duty and a hospital’s emerging direct liability58 to patients 
for the failure of its system of care (which is more in accord 
with systems error research).59
Cases such as Harriton send a dangerous signal about the 
lack of judicial interest in professional care in the crucial 
area of follow-up and disclosing adverse incidents. This is 
particularly concerning given the growing interest of third 
parties such as insurance companies, health management 
organisations or employers in the results of genetic tests.60
If, however, the doctor’s fiduciary obligations to the patient 
were extended, patients would benefit. In Moore v Regents 
of University of California,61 the Supreme Court of California 
held that the legal fiduciary duties of the relevant doctors 
included a responsibility to disclose ‘all information material 
to the patient’s decision’ to undergo treatment.62 In Breen v 
Williams, Gummow J cited Moore, stating:
‘In such cases ... the fiduciary principle would monitor the 
abuse of loyalty reposed in the medical practitioner by the 
patient.’63
An extended fiduciary duty might also require doctors, 
particularly in high-risk situations, to disclose to patients 
any inducements by private pharmaceutical companies or 
health management organisations that might have influenced 
a clinical decision.64
The advantages of using fiduciary law, rather than general 
negligence, to protect the interests of patients are not just 
temporal and practical; this approach is more consistent 
with legal theory. Good law proceeds from a commitment to 
fundamental professional and social virtues, such as justice 
and loyalty to relieving patient suffering.  
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